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1. Introduction 
It is common in the U.S. that corporate insiders pledge their stock ownership as collateral 
for a personal loan. According to a recent survey twenty percent of U.S. companies allow 
pledging by executives and 982 directors or officers reported a pledge in the beneficial 
ownership section of the proxy statement from 2006 to 2009 (Larcker and Tayan, 2010). 
Recently, the shares pledged have caught the attention of regulators worldwide. In a 
September 2006 Release, the SEC of U.S. started to require the disclosure of the number of 
shares pledged as security by named executive officers, directors and director nominees (SEC, 
2006). In January 2009, the FSA of U.K. issued a statement confirming that shares pledged are 
covered by the disclosure requirement of transactions by directors (FSA, 2009). Also in January 
2009, the Securities and Exchange Board of India announced to require the disclosure of shares 
pledged of controlling shareholders if it exceeds 25,000 shares or 1 percent of the total 
shareholding or voting rights of the company (SEB, 2009).  
Despite its increasing importance, we know very little, if anything, about the relevance of 
shares pledged to corporate decisions. In comments on the SEC proposal, one objection to 
disclosure is that shares pledged “is not material information, as we are aware of no empirical 
evidence suggesting that the pledging of stock would adversely influence the individual’s 
decisions regarding the issuer.” (Renwick, 2006) 
To fill the void, this paper examines one of the incentives faced by insiders with shares 
pledged that will influence corporate decisions. When insiders pledge their shareholdings, they 
are subject to margin calls because, like buying stock on margin, pledge contracts usually include 
a maintenance requirement. When the market value of the pledged shares drops below the 
maintenance requirement, the borrower needs to meet the margin call. Otherwise, the lender can 
sell shares.  
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To reduce the pressure from margin calls, one option insiders have is to use corporate 
resources. Insiders can initiate an open market repurchase in the hope of supporting a falling 
stock price by absorbing sell pressure (Cook, Krigman, and Leach, 2004; Ginglinger and Hamon, 
2007). When it revised rules regulating repurchases, the SEC explicitly expressed a concern that 
repurchase can be abused if it is “designed to support the market price of the issuer’s securities in 
order to maintain the value of securities pledged by insiders as collateral for bank loans” (SEC, 
1980). Therefore, companies are more likely to announce open market repurchases when insiders 
pledge their shares and the pressure from margin call is high. 
Given a repurchase announcement, investors will evaluate the probability that the 
repurchase is used for relieving the pressure of margin calls. If the probability is high, they are 
less likely to change their view of the fundamental value of the stock and the announcement 
effect should be small. 
To empirically examine the effect of share pledge on the repurchase decision and its market 
reactions, we use a sample of 1,386 open market repurchase announcements from companies 
listed on the exchanges in Taiwan. Insiders of listed companies in Taiwan are required to file 
monthly report of the numbers of shares owned and shares pledged. These data is public 
available from 1997. To the best of our knowledge, Taiwan offers the longest time series for 
studying share pledge. Most countries either do not require or have only required such a 
disclosure recently and data is limited. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that companies are more likely to repurchase when 
the percentage of shares pledged is higher. The probability is especially higher when shares 
pledged is high and there is a large stock price drop recently, predicted by the margin call 
pressure hypothesis. Evidence also suggests that investors perceive this margin call incentive. We 
find that, the market response to the repurchase announcement is decreasing with shares pledged, 
 4
especially after a significant price drop. 
There are several possible reasons why insiders faced with margin pressures will choose to 
repurchase instead of selling their own shares. Insiders may have positive private information 
that will drive up the stock price soon. Insiders may not have private information but are 
irrationally optimistic about company prospects. Insiders may need their shares to maintain 
control rights. 
Positive private information can explain the correlation between shares pledged and 
repurchase. Insiders may choose to hold rather than sell shares because they know the market 
price underestimates the fundamental. An undervalued stock is also a good reason for the 
company to repurchase shares. Positive private information, however, cannot explain our 
evidence that announcement effect to repurchase as well as long-term stock performance is 
worse when shares pledged are higher. 
Our findings of a positive correlation between shares pledged and repurchase as well as a 
negative correlation between shares pledged and announcement effect is consistent with 
optimism. We construct a measure of optimism using corporate earnings forecasts, and find our 
results remain the same after removing optimistic samples. Therefore, optimism is not used by 
controlling shareholders to reduce the margin call pressure.  
We also provide evidence that companies suffer less pledge-repurchase relationship problem 
if they have good governance. When the outside bolockholding is larger, the effect of pledge on 
propensity of initiating buyback program becomes weaker; investors react less negatively to a 
high-pledged company.  
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The first one links executives’ personal 
attributes to corporate behaviors. CEOs’ experiences and behavioral biases affect investment and 
financing decisions (Heaton, 2002; Lin, Hu, and Chen, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
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Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011). Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012) study CEOs’ personal 
leverage in their home purchases and find that is positively related to corporate leverage. Our 
paper contributes to this literature by adding that controlling shareholders’ personal shares 
pledged affects corporate payout policy. 
The second related literature is on open market repurchase and corporate governance. 
Repurchase can be used to distribute free cash flow or to deter takeover (Billett and Xue, 2007; 
Dittmar, 2000; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1988). Our paper argues that controlling shareholders use 
repurchase to meet margin call pressure in order to keep control rights. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 
3 describes institution environment of Taiwan and data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 
reports empirical results. Section 5 is robustness check. Section 6 concludes this paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
Controlling shareholders can borrow money and use shares owned as a pledge. The money 
borrowed can be used for personal consumption. Of course, the controlling shareholder can also 
sell shares to make consumption. However, they may not want to sell shares for either an 
information reason or for a control reason. If controlling shareholders think the market price is 
less than its fundamental value, they will be reluctant to sell their shares immediately. They can 
borrow money first and wait until the market price goes up to its fundamental value to sell. 
Another reason that the controlling shareholders choose not to sell shares but to borrow is to 
keep control. The control right is valuable when there is private benefit. The controlling 
shareholders maintain their control right by holding enough voting power. Selling shares can 
reduce the voting power and risk losing the control right.  
When keeping control is important, the controlling shareholder may also borrow money to 
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support the firm’s investment projects. When a firm has good investment projects but lacks 
internal cash flow, it may choose to issue new equity as a financing source if more leverage is 
costly. To maintain the relative control right, the controlling shareholder needs to buy the new 
issued shares. If personal wealth is not enough, the controlling shareholder will borrow money to 
buy the new shares. Therefore, borrow against stocks is one way that controlling shareholders 
use to pursue investment project under personal financial constraints (Chen and Hu (2007)). 
Despite its benefits, borrowing against stocks will carry a risk of losing control. Under the 
stock pledge agreement, the lender will impose a maintenance requirement that the market value 
of the pledged stock cannot fall below. If the maintenance requirement is not met, the loan is in 
default. Other than the usual default risk, there is an additional element of market price risk. The 
market price can drop to a level that violates the maintenance requirement. When this happens, 
the lender may sell the pledged shares unilaterally. Lacking the voting power from pledged 
shares, the controlling shareholder risk losing the control right. 
When there is an imminent risk that the market price will drop to a level that violates the 
maintenance requirement, controlling shareholders may use company fund to repurchase stock in 
the hope of supporting or even artificially increasing the market price. A repurchase 
announcement can increase the stock price if investors are misled to believe that the repurchase 
firm is undervalued (Chan, Ikenberry, Lee and Wang (2010)). A repurchase can also be used to 
support a falling stock price by absorbing sell pressure (Cook, Krigman and Leach (2004) and 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007)).  
If investors understand that a repurchase is only used to support prices (or to mislead them), 
they will not revise their estimate of the fundamental value. Therefore, given a repurchase 
announcement, investors will estimate the fundamental value based on the probability of price 
support. The higher the probability of price support, the less positive the market reaction will be.   
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The probability that a repurchase is used to support prices is decreasing to the net worth of 
the controlling shareholders. When the net worth is high, the controlling shareholder can easily 
repay the loan or increase the pledge to satisfy the maintenance requirement.  
Define the relative net worth as one minus the ratio of personal debt to asset. Holding other 
things constant, the relative net worth is decreasing to the percentage of shares pledged. Given 
that the initial market value of shares pledged cannot be lower than the amount borrowed, the 
higher the number of shares pledged, the higher the personal debt level. On the other hand, the 
higher the number of shares owned, the higher the personal asset level. Combining the two 
together, a higher the pledge ratio (shares pledged divided by the shares owned) means a higher 
personal debt to asset ratio or a lower personal net worth to asset ratio. Therefore, the probability 
that a repurchase is used to support prices is increasing to the pledge ratio. 
To summarize our discussions so far, we have the following two hypotheses, namely margin 
call pressure hypothesis: 
 
H1a: The higher the pledge ratio of controlling shareholders, the more likely the company 
will repurchase shares. 
H2a: The higher the pledge ratio of controlling shareholders, the less positive the market 
reaction to a repurchase announcement. 
 
Holding other things constant, the sensitivity of the relative net worth to the pledge ratio 
depends on the recent stock return. A lower stock return will reduce the personal asset level and 
create a difference with debt level, and the difference is increasing to the number of shares 
owned or decreasing to the pledge ratio. Therefore, the sensitivity of the probability of 




H1b: The sensitivity of the probability of repurchase to the pledge ratio is more positive 
when the recent stock return is lower. 
H2b: The sensitivity of the market reaction to the pledge ratio is more negative when the 
recent stock return is lower. 
 
The sensitivity of the relative net worth to the pledge ratio also depends on the alternatives 
that the controlling shareholder has to meet the margin call. If there are other alternatives, the 
sensitivity will be smaller. Of course, a repurchase program is not the only option that the 
controlling shareholder can choose when facing a market price drop. The shareholder can also 
select to increase the number of shares pledged to satisfy the maintenance requirement or to use 
other assets to repay the loan. To increase the number of shares pledged will increase the risk of 
losing control if the maintenance requirement is violated again. Therefore, if the pledge ratio gets 
higher before the repurchase announcement, it signals that the controlling shareholder lacks other 
assets and the sensitivity is higher.   
 
H1c: The sensitivity of the probability of repurchase to the pledge ratio is more positive 
when the pledge ratio experiences an increase recently. 
H2c: The sensitivity of the market reaction to the pledge ratio is more negative when the 
pledge ratio experiences an increase recently. 
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3. Environment and Data  
3.1. Repurchases in Taiwan 
Taiwan’s Securities and Exchange Law was revised in August 2000 to allow listed 
companies to buy back their own stock (Article 28-2). The deregulation allows firms to initiate 
buyback programs in the open market. The security laws were also amended to prohibit the 
selling by insiders and their spouses and children during the buyback period.  
A repurchase program has to be authorized by the board of a company. Within two days 
after the authorization, firms are required to disclose the detailed repurchase plan to the public. 
The disclosure should include its purpose, the intended total number of shares to be purchased, 
the range of the price per share that the program would be executed, the maximum total dollar 
amount to spend on the program, and the execution status of prior buyback programs announced 
in the past three years. The repurchase period can last for two months from the announcement 
date.1 For each repurchase program, the number of shares bought cannot be more than 10% of 
the firm’s outstanding shares. The shares bought each day during the buyback period cannot 
exceed one third of the intended total shares that were disclosed at the announcement.2  
One feature of Taiwanese repurchases that is distinct from repurchases in the US is the 
disclosure requirement of the execution status.3  Firms are obliged to provide a detailed 
execution report within five days of the completion of the program or the expiration of 
                                                 
1 Initially, the repurchase program can be valid only for 30 days from their public disclosure. The one-month 
repurchase period was extended to two months since October 2000.   
2 Article 8 of the Regulations Governing Share Repurchases by Listed and OTC Companies 
3 Before 2004, U.S. companies have no obligation to disclose any information regarding the status of execution of 
open market repurchase program. On December 2003, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
promulgated a new disclosure requirement for share repurchase. Firms are required to disclose the status of 
execution for share repurchase each month during the repurchase period and disclose their repurchase activity for 
the past quarter in their 10-Q and 10-K filings beginning in January 2004. More detailed information could be found 
at Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by Issuer and Others, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8335, 68 Fed. Rec. 
64,952 (Nov. 17, 2003). 
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repurchase period, whichever comes first. Firms also need to disclose their execution status 
within two days if they have bought more than 2% of outstanding shares throughout the program. 
The report should include the actual number of shares bought, the actual dollar amount 
purchased, and the average share price of buybacks. Such a disclosure requirement in Taiwan 
enables us to easily track the buyback execution.  
 
3.2. Data 
All data about repurchase and the characteristics of the firm and its controlling shareholders 
are retrieved from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. TEJ is the most comprehensive 
financial database of the Taiwanese market. The database also provides return, accounting, and 
Fama-French three-factor return data for all listed companies in Taiwan. The SIC code for each 
company is obtained from Thomason Financial Datastream. 
The initial buyback sample includes 2,082 programs announced during the period of 
October 13, 2000 to December 31, 2006.4 Our sample ends on 2006 because we examine 
three-year firm performance after repurchases. We focus on industrial firms and drop 306 
observations made by financial firms. We further exclude 390 cases as we cannot identify 
controlling shareholders or obtain required data. Our final sample comprises of 1,386 repurchase 
programs made by 509 firms. The announcement date is identified as the date that a share 
repurchase appears in TEJ or the date that the news is reported in the newspaper, whichever is 
earlier. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the sample. On average, sample firms intended to buy 
back 3.2% of equity at announcements. They actually purchased 2.1% of outstanding shares 
                                                 
4 We drop observations before October 13, 2000 because the execution period of repurchase was changed from 30 
to 60 days on that day. 
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during the two-month repurchase period, amounting to NT$134 million. The mean (median) 
completion ratio is about 70% (84%), suggesting that most of repurchase firms bought some 
shares as they originally planned. On average, the market offers a favorable reaction of 1.4% 
(1.5%) abnormal return over the three-day (five-day) window (-1,+1)/(-2,+2) relative to 
repurchase announcement. 
Taiwanese repurchase firms tend to be larger, value firms, with size and book-to-market 
ratio higher than the average firm in the stock market. Consistent with the literature, we find 
some evidence supporting undervaluation, free cash flow and leverage adjustment hypotheses in 
Taiwanese repurchases. For example, these repurchase firms have significantly negative returns 
in the three-months prior to buyback announcements. They also have higher free cash flows and 
lower leverage relative to industry medians.  
Share pledge data was available for Taiwanese listed companies since 1997 due to a 
regulation requirement5. Article 25 of the Securities and Exchange Law requires directors, 
supervisors, managers, and large shareholders (holding more than 10% of the outstanding shares) 
in listed companies to file the number of shares held and the number pledged to Securities and 
Futures Bureau (SFB) every month. We define the share pledge ratio as the shareholdings that 
are controlled by the controlling shareholders and pledged for bank loans divided by the shares 
controlled at the end of the month prior to repurchase announcement. 
The controlling shareholder (ultimate owner) is the shareholder who owns the most voting 
rights in the company and exercises effective managerial authority identified by the TEJ database. 
We focus on controlling shareholders, rather than other stakeholders, because they are the key 
persons to initiate and execute buyback programs. Meanwhile, given their large control over the 
                                                 
5 According to the same Article, they should also file with the SFB and announce to the public when they pledge 
their shares for personal loan. According to Paragraph 3 of Article 22-2 of the Securities and Exchange Law, the 
pledged shares here have to include the shares held by shareholders under the names of their spouses, minor children, 
and those held in the name of other parties. 
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firm, any twist in their incentives due to their share pledge status may have significant effect on 
firm value. 
The calculation of voting rights is based on the notion of ultimate control that traces the 
pyramid of ownership structure (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999)). The voting 
rights comprise of the direct and indirect voting rights held by the controlling shareholders of a 
company. Direct voting rights include the rights to those shares registered under the name of the 
ultimate owner and his/her family members related through blood or marriage. Indirect voting 
rights are the rights to those shares held by entities, for example, corporations, investment 
companies, and other legal entities, which are controlled by the ultimate owner. If we cannot 
identify the controlling shareholder based on voting rights, we exclude the firm from our 
analysis. 
There is some variation in share pledge ratios across sample observations. Although the 
average of share pledge ratio is 11.7%, the median is zero. There are more than half of the 
sample firms whose controlling shareholders do not pledge their shares at all; however, more 
than 5% of repurchases keep a share pledge ratio more than 50%. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Propensity to Repurchase 
In this section, we examine the extent to which firms initiate repurchases by the share 
pledges of controlling shareholders. Our hypothesis 1 (H1a) predicts that firms with higher share 
pledges are more likely to have buybacks. This holds true especially when there is a market 
pressure on share price (H1b and H1c).  
Before testing our hypotheses, we first check if repurchase firms indeed have more share 
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pledges than non-repurchase firms. We pull out all firm-quarters during October, 2000 to 
December 2006. We assign a firm/quarter as a repurchase quarter if the firm made a repurchase 
announcement in that given quarter. The remaining quarters are classified as non-repurchase 
quarters. Firm characteristics and share pledges at the prior quarter-end are compared for the two 
groups and the results are reported in Table 2. 
The share pledge ratio is 11.5% for repurchase quarters and 10.1% for non-repurchase 
quarters. The difference is significant at 5% level. This result suggests that controlling 
shareholders in repurchase firms do pledge more shares in banks. While this evidence seems to 
support the notion that higher pledges are associated with buybacks, it is not clear whether other 
factors motivate managers to initiate repurchases. For example, repurchase firms show negative 
returns prior to the repurchase announcements but non-repurchase firms generate positive prior 
returns, with a difference in returns more than 11% in the prior quarter. This suggests that firms 
may initiate buybacks to resolve the undervaluation problem. In addition, repurchase firms have 
much lower leverage and higher free cash flow, both adjusted for the industry norm, than other 
firms. The result is consistent with the managerial motives of disgorging excess cash that firms 
initiate buybacks to distribute idle cash to investors to reduce the potential free cash problem. It 
is also consistent with the leverage motivation that firms use repurchase to alter capital structure 
to reach the optimal debt ratio and increase firm value. 
We employ two approaches to formally test if share pledges affect managerial incentives to 
buy back shares. The first approach is the logit regressions of buyback announcements based on 
firm-quarter observations shown in Table 2. The dependent variable is repurchase dummy which 
equals to one if the firm made a repurchase announcement in the given quarter and zero 
elsewhere. As argued in the literature, the repurchase decision could be affected by signaling for 
undervaluation, disgorging free cash flows, and adjusting for capital structure (e.g., Chan, 
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Ikenberry and Lee (2004), Dittmar (2000)). As a result, we include in regressions the 
book-to-market ratio (B/M) to proxy for the extent of undervaluation (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen, 1995) and the industry-adjusted free cash flow (FCF) and industry-adjusted leverage 
(LEV) to control for managerial incentives to reduce agency costs of free cash flows and to seek 
for optimal capital structure. All independent variables are measured prior to the quarter in 
question.  
The results of logit regressions are reported in Table 3. We find that share pledges are 
significantly and positively related to the probability that firms initiate a repurchase program 
even when we control for B/M, FCF and LEV (Model 1). This result supports H1a; the higher 
the percentage of shares pledged by controlling shareholders, the more likely the company will 
repurchase shares. The next few regression models examine if firms tend to initiate buyback 
programs when their prior performance is poor or when there is an enormous margin call 
pressure faced by controlling shareholders. We use the interaction terms of share pledge and 
stock return in the prior quarter to estimate the propensity to repurchase in the presence of share 
price pressure. We find a negative coefficient of this interaction term, suggesting that the worse 
the prior stock performance is, the stronger the effect of pledge on the probability that firms will 
initiate buyback programs (Model 2). When we measure the share price pressure by a low prior 
return dummy that equals to one if the prior stock return is below -20%, we find a consistent 
result (Model 3).6 For firms with prior returns below -20%, the effect of pledge on the 
probability of repurchase is 0.95, more than twice the effect for firms with a better prior return 
(0.35). Finally, we use the increase in share pledges as a proxy for the margin call pressure faced 
by controlling shareholders. If high-pledged controlling shareholders have increased their 
                                                 
6 We try various thresholds to define the prior return dummy, ranging from -10% to -25% and results are similar to 
what we report here. 
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pledged share, they are more likely to be facing the margin call pressure and using repurchase to 
relieve the pressure. Model 4 provides consistent results. All these results support our hypothesis 
1b and 1c; the lower the prior stock performance or the larger margin call pressure, the more 
likely the company will repurchase shares.  
To shed more light on the economic significance of pledge-motivated repurchase, we 
estimate the probability of repurchase given specific values of explanatory variables based on 
Model 1 (or Model 5) of Table 3. We report the results in Table 4: Panel A uses the fitted 
coefficient values of Model 1 and Panel B uses the fitted coefficient values of Model 5.  
In Panel A, each row describes different motivations of repurchase. Row 1 considers the 
base case, assuming all explanatory variables are set at their sample means. The remaining rows 
describe the impact of different motivations of share repurchases. For each row, we consider a 
key variable with an increase (a decrease) of one standard deviation from sample mean, holding 
others explanatory variables at their means (neutral levels). For instance, we set the share pledge 
ratio at mean plus one standard deviation (0.30) to describe the pledge motivation, holding others 
explanatory variables at their means (Row 2). We set B/M ratio at sample mean plus one 
standard deviation to describe undervaluation motivation (Row 3), set FCF at sample mean plus 
one standard deviation to describe free cash flow motivation (Row 4), set LEV at sample mean 
minus one standard deviation to describe leverage motivation (Row 5), and set cash dividend at 
sample mean minus one standard deviation to describe dividend substitute (Row 6). 
Panel A shows that the magnitude of the pledge motivation is economically significant. As 
reported in Row 2, we find that the propensity to repurchase increases by 0.54%, which is a 10% 
increase from the base case, when the firm experience an increase of one standard deviation in 
share pledge. By contrast, the probability of repurchase increases by 0.40% and 1.10% when the 
firm has an increase of one standard deviation in B/M and FCF, respectively. A decrease of one 
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standard deviation in LEV (Cash dividend) leads to an increase of 1.76% (1.29%) in the 
probability of repurchase. Compared to other well-documented explanations for repurchase, the 
pledge motivation is larger than the undervaluation motivation, but lower than the free cash flow, 
leverage, and dividend substitute motivations.  
The pledge-motivated repurchase becomes much more important when controlling 
shareholders face larger market pressure on margin call, i.e., a lower prior return and an increase 
in the share pledge ratio. In Panel B, we set the low prior return dummy and the increase pledge 
dummy to be zero in the base case and equal one in the pledge motivation Row 2. We find that 
an increase of one standard deviation in share pledge given the market pressure implies an 
increase of 2.05% (from 5.29% to 7.34%) in repurchase probability, which is a 38% of increase 
from the base case. Compared to an increase of 0.33% to 1.71% for the traditional motivations, 
the relative impact of the pledge motivation is the strongest of all.  
The second approach we use to examine the effect of pledges is the Tobit regression of 
actual repurchases. Since there is no binding mechanism for repurchases and no penalty for not 
buying back shares, repurchase firms have the flexibility and discretion in executing the 
repurchase programs (Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Chan, Ikenberry, Lee and Wang 
(2010)). Here, we examine the extent to which the actual repurchase activity is driven by share 
pledges. The dependent variable is the actual buyback defined as the shares actually purchased 
during the two-month repurchase period following the announcement divided by the shares 
outstanding prior to the announcement.7 As in Table 3, we include B/M, FCF, LEV, and cash 
dividend in regressions to control for key motives behind repurchases, such as undervaluation, 
distribution of excess cash and optimal leverage adjustment.8 The regression results are reported 
                                                 
7 We also use the completion ratio (the actual buyback ratio divided by the intended ratio) as the dependent variable 
for robustness checks. The results are qualitatively similar. To save space, we do not report here. 
8 Gong, Louis and Sun (2008) and Chan, Ikenberry, Lee and Wong (2010) find that discretionary accruals (DA) are 
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in Table 5.    
We find that the pledge ratio positively affect the propensity to buy back shares. The 
relation between pledge and actual buyback is strengthened when there is stress on share price or 
margin call pressure. Model 2 shows that the lower the prior returns, the more shares firms will 
repurchase. When prior return is remarkably low (e.g., below -20%), the pledge effect on 
repurchase is much stronger (2.39 vs. 0.99). If controlling shareholders increase their pledges 
previously, the potential margin call pressure provides extra incentives for them to buy back 
shares.   
Overall, repurchase firms are associated with higher share pledges by controlling 
shareholders. The higher share pledges incentivize firms to initiate buyback programs and 
increase the propensity to actually purchase shares. This is particularly true when margin call 
pressure is prevalent. These results are consistent with our hypothesis 1. 
 
4.2. Short-term market reaction  
We have documented that share pledged by controlling shareholders affect their incentives 
to repurchase. In this section, we go one step further to examine if the market responds to share 
pledges in any systematic pattern. Our hypothesis 2 argues that if controlling shareholders 
initiate buybacks more for reducing their personal price pressure than for increasing general 
shareholder value, the market reaction would be less favorable. We test this idea in Table 6 by 
regression analyses. The dependent variable is a three-day (-1, +1) cumulative return around 
repurchase announcement adjusts for the value-weighted market index return over the same 
                                                                                                                                                             
negatively related to actual buyback. We employ Gong et al approach to compute DA and find our results are not 
affected by DAs. Because using DA will significantly reduce the sample size, we do not report the results here. 
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window.9 
Table 6 reports results of announcement return regressions. As shown in Model 1, pledge 
ratio is significantly and negatively related to short-term market reaction. The literature offers an 
undervaluation theory to explain the favorable market reaction of repurchases (Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) and Dittmar (2000)). Prior research also suggests the 
rationales of disgorging free cash flow and altering capital structure for repurchases. In Model 2, 
we include variables B/M, FCF, LEV, and prior returns to control for these well-documented 
stories. We also control for the intended ratio as the previous research shows that the abnormal 
announcement return is positively related to program size (e.g., Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004)). 
Yet, with the inclusion of all these control variables in the regression, the pledge coefficient only 
changes from -0.028 to -0.023 and remains significantly negative. 
In the next few models, we test if the market response is more negative when the repurchase 
is more likely due to a margin call pressure. As in Table 3 and Table 5, we gauge the margin call 
pressure by three measures: prior returns, a low prior return dummy and prior increases in share 
pledges dummy. Controlling shareholders are more likely to face a margin call pressure when the 
stock price has dropped or when they have increased their pledge ratio to meet the maintenance 
requirement. Our results suggest that the negative effect of share pledges on the announcement 
returns concentrates on the situation when the margin call pressure is high. For example, in 
Models 4, the interaction terms of pledges and low prior return dummy is significantly negative, 
suggesting that the market respond more negatively for a higher pledge ratio when the market 
drops more than 20%. While the interaction terms are significant, the share pledge itself is not 
significant anymore. As a result, the evidence here indicates that the negative impact of share 
                                                 
9 Our results hold when we employ five-day window (-2, +2) cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent 
variable. 
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pledges is accentuated at the time when a margin call is expected.10  
Chen and Wang (2012) argue that financial constraints are important in explaining the 
performance of share buybacks. To account for such an effect, we also control for Kaplan and 
Zingales’ (1997) KZ index in Model 7. We do not include FCF and LEV in this model because 
they are components in the KZ index. After controlling for financial constraints, our main result 
continues to hold. 
In summary, we find that share pledges have a negative effect on the announcement returns 
of repurchases. The more controlling shareholders pledge their shares, the less favorable the 
market reacts. This negative aspect is especially strong when the margin call is more imminent. 
All these results are consistent with our hypothesis 2. 
 
4.3. Long-run returns 
Under an efficient market, stock price will quickly incorporate information released at the 
repurchase announcement. Yet, an extensive literature reports a long-run return drift following 
corporate decisions. 11  Therefore, we examine three-year abnormal returns after buyback 
announcements and report results in Table 7. The method used to estimate long-run returns is 
illustrated in the Appendix B. 
The long-run stock performance following repurchase announcements is generally 
consistent with the immediate market reaction reported in Table 6. There is a strong negative 
                                                 
10 To better understand the share pledge effect on shareholder value, we perform the regression on different 
sub-samples as in Models 3 and 4 of Table 6. First, we sort sample firms into prior three-month return quartiles and 
run regressions. Except the highest prior return quartile, all other three groups exhibit a negative share pledge effect. 
The magnitudes of negative impact are monotonic decreasing with prior returns, indicating that the damaging impact 
of pledges is accentuated in firms with poor past returns. In addition, we also classify the sample into firms with 
increases in pledges in the past three months and those without prior pledge increases. The result shows that only 
firms with prior pledge increases show a negative share pledge effect. To save space, the results are available from 
the authors upon request. 
11 See, for example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) and Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004) for 
repurchases and Loughran and Ritter (1995) for equity offerings. 
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relation between share pledges and future stock returns suggesting that investors do not fully 
account for the pledge effect. We do not find additional long-run effect for firms with a higher 
margin call pressure. Therefore, there is no evidence that the announcement effect is reversed in 
the future.  
 
5. Robustness Check 
5.1. Existing explanations for repurchase 
Prior studies propose numerous theories to explain the managerial motive of buybacks. 
Three major ones are undervaluation, free cash flow, and leverage (e.g., Dittmar, (2000), Chan, 
Ikenberry and Lee (2004)). It is plausible that firms with high share pledges initiate repurchases 
to signal an undervaluation, to resolve the potential agency problem, or to increase the firm 
leverage.  
Controlling shareholders who perceive share price trading below fair value may choose not 
to sell but to borrow and pledge with shares for personal financing. These controlling 
shareholders who have favorable information about firms’ fundamentals may even use proceeds 
from pledges to purchase more shares to take advantage of current low share price. The 
conviction of undervaluation can also motivate the companies controlled by the same people to 
repurchase shares. 
On the other hand, firms with high share pledges have the potential of more agency 
problems as controlling shareholders have incentives to use corporate resources to support share 
price for their personal benefit. In order to persuade outside shareholders that these agency 
problems will not occur, controlling shareholders can use repurchase to distribute free cash flows 
to mitigate the potential agency problem.  
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Finally, behavioral consistency theory suggests that the leverage decision of a firm should 
reflect the debt tolerance of its controlling shareholder and such tolerance also decides the 
controlling shareholder’s personal leverage choice (Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker, 2012). 
Therefore, the purpose of the repurchase is to increase the firm leverage to match its controlling 
shareholder’s high debt tolerance.  
Although the three explanations offered, undervaluation, agency problem, and debt 
tolerance can all explain a positive correlation between pledge ratio and the probability of 
repurchase, they cannot fully explain all the evidence presented so far. First, we have included in 
all tables variables to control for the three explanations: book-to-market value of equity (B/M) to 
control for undervaluation, free cash flows (FCF) to control for agency problem, and leverage 
(LEV) to control for debt tolerance. These control variables indeed behave the way they are 
supposed to: repurchase firms tend to have higher B/M, higher free cash flows, and lower debt 
ratio. Share pledge is unlikely to capture the three explanations given that they have been 
controlled for. Second, if the pledge ratio proxies for the extent of undervaluation and agency 
problems, we would expect a positive relation between share pledges and buyback 
announcement return. On the contrary, we find that firms with high pledges actually get less 
favorable market reaction both on the announcement (Table 6) and afterwards (Table 7). We have 
also included the change in the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders to proxy for 
undervaluation. If controlling shareholders believe firms are undervalued, they are likely to 
increase their cash flow right in order to profit from the difference. Therefore, we expect to see a 
positive relation between market reaction and the change in cash flow rights. However, we do 
not find such evidence. Third, if the positive correlation between pledge ratio and repurchase 
reflects a common debt tolerance, this relation should be stronger when the firm leverage drops 
following a rise in stock price. Instead, we find that the relation is stronger following a drop in 
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stock price using logit (Table 3) or Tobit (Table 5) regressions.. 
 
5.2. An alternative explanation based on optimism 
Optimism can be an alternative explanation for what we have observed. If a controlling 
shareholder is optimistic about the future performance of the company, his forecast will be 
biased upward and he will think the stock of his company is undervalued even when it is fairly 
priced by the market. An optimistic controlling shareholder is unlikely to sell his shareholdings. 
If he needs money, he can pledge shares to borrow. He may even use proceeds from pledges to 
purchase more shares. An optimistic controlling shareholder will also make the firm to 
repurchase its shares. As a result, we will observe a positive relation between the pledge ratio and 
repurchase. Optimism can also explain the negative relation between the pledge ratio and market 
reactions when investors realize the repurchase is driven by optimism.  
To make sure optimism is not the reason for our results; we provide two pieces of evidence. 
First, we have included in the return regression (Tables 6 and 7) the change in cash flow right of 
controlling shareholders to control for optimism. Optimistic controlling shareholders are likely to 
increase their cash flow rights. The estimated coefficient on the change in cash flow right is not 
significantly different from zero and pledge-related variables are still significant as we predict. 
However, the change in cash flow right can also be a measure of the true extent of 
undervaluation and we need a better measure of optimism. 
If controlling shareholders are optimistic, their forecasts of companies’ future performance 
are likely to be biased upward. Lin, Hu, and Chen (2005) use this concept to construct a measure 
of optimism. A controlling shareholder is defined to be optimistic if more than half of their 
companies’ forecasts of its own annual earnings are higher than the realized ones.  
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To make sure our results are not driven by optimism, we exclude from the sample the 257 
buyback programs initiated by firms with optimistic controlling shareholders. We then reexamine 
the short-run announcement effect around repurchase announcements and report results in Table 
8. Table 8 notes that our margin call pressure hypothesis continues to hold in this non-optimistic 
sample. The results are similar to the full sample results reported in Table 6. For non-optimistic 
controlling shareholders, their pledge ratio has a significantly negative impact on the 
announcement return, especially when the margin call pressure is high. Therefore, optimism is 
unlikely to drive our results.  
 
5.3. Control rights concern 
Facing a margin call pressure, controlling shareholders can choose to sell some shares to 
reduce his borrowing. The reason not to sell shares but to use repurchase is to prevent the losses 
of control right and the associated private benefit. This argument is based on the assumption that 
the controlling shareholders’ power solely comes from shareholding. However, if shareholding is 
not the only source of their power, controlling shareholders will have less incentive to use 
repurchase to support price. As a result, the negative impact of share pledge on stock return will 
be smaller for these companies.  
To test this margin call hypothesis, we separate the whole sample into two groups according 
to the median of controlling shareholders’ voting rights: One has the bottom 50% of control 
rights and the other has the top 50%. The bottom 50% group consists of the companies whose 
controlling shareholder have smaller voting right, indicating that their power is less likely to only 
come from shareholding. The control power of those companies in the top 50% group is more 
likely to be based on shareholding. We perform cross-sectional regression of short-run returns 
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around repurchase announcement for both two groups. Under margin call hypothesis, we expect 
to see a stronger negative correlation between share pledge and stock return for the top 50% 
group. 
Numbers in Table 9 indeed shows that the coefficient on pledge is different across the two 
groups. The coefficients of share pledge and the interaction terms between share pledge and 
margin call pressure are all significantly negative for the top 50% group. By contrast, we do not 
find any significant coefficient in the bottom 50% group. The evidence is consistent with the 
margin call hypothesis. 
 
5.4. Repurchase and corporate governance 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), among others argue that corporate governance deals with the 
agency problem. For example, large shareholders, e.g. institutional shareholders and 
blockholders, are shown to reduce the concern of agency problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Pagano and Roell, 1998; Gillian and Starks, 2000; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). The presence of 
independent (or outside) directors also decreases the cost of monitoring and improves the quality 
of monitor (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Raheja, 2005). In this 
section, we investigate whether good governance can reduce the pledge-repurchase relationship. 
The hypothesis is that the pledge-repurchase relationship problem becomes weaker when the 
firm has good governance.  
Table 10 reports the results on governance. Models 1 and 2 perform logit and tobit 
regression in examining which firms initiate repurchases. We find the effect pledge on the 
probability of initiating buyback programs becomes significantly weaker when the largest 
outside blockholder’s ownership increases. The largest outside blockholder has the incentive, 
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information, directorship, and votes to affect the decision of the controlling shareholder. On the 
other hand, institutional investor holdings and independent directors do not have noticeable 
impact on the propensity to repurchase.  
Model 3 is the announcement return regression. We find that the coefficient of share pledge 
is significantly negatively related to short-term market reaction as in Table 6. The interaction 
term between share pledge and blockholder holdings is positive (the t value is 1.37 with a 
one-tail probability of 8.5%). The marginally significant and positive coefficient means that 
investors take into account of the governance mechanism. When the outside blockholding is 
larger, investors react less negatively to a high-pledged company. 
 
6. Conclusions 
More recently, the shares pledged of insiders have received much attention of regulators 
worldwide. However, the relevance of shares pledge to corporate decisions is little understood. 
We fill this gap by examining the impact of controlling shareholders’ shares pledged on the 
repurchase decisions and its market reactions from Taiwan stock market. We focus on these data 
because insiders of listed companies in Taiwan are required to file monthly report of the number 
of shares owned and share pledged. 
Consistent with the notion of margin call pressure hypothesis, we find that companies are 
more likely to initiate buyback program when the percentage of shares pledged is higher. This 
probability is higher especially when share pledged is high and when there is a large stock drop 
recently. We also find that investors are aware of the margin call incentive. The market reaction 
to the repurchase announcement is negatively associated with share pledged, especially after a 
significant price drop. In particular, our results of positive correlation between shares pledged as 
well as a negative relation between shares pledged and announcement effect are not fully 
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explained by undervaluation, free cash flow, leverage, and managerial optimism explanations. 
Finally, we also provide evidence that companies suffer less pledge-repurchase relationship 
problem when the outside bolockholding is larger. 
We contribute to the literature by two dimensions. First, we add to our understanding about 
the impact of controlling shareholders’ shares pledges on corporate payout policy. Second, we 
contribute to the literature by adding that controlling shareholders are more likely to use 
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A. Variable definition 
The definitions of variables we use in the return regressions are listed below. 
 
Actual buyback amount is the dollar amount (in NT$ million) of shares actually purchased by 
firms during the two-month repurchase period following repurchase announcements, 
adjusted for 2009 consumer price index.  
Intended ratio is the percentage of shares intended to buy at the announcement to shares 
outstanding prior to repurchase announcement.  
Actual buyback is the percentage of shares actually purchased during the two-month repurchase 
period following repurchase announcements to shares outstanding prior to repurchase 
announcement.  
Completion ratio is the ratio of actual buyback ratio to intended ratio.  
Three-day CAR/Five-day CAR is the three-day cumulative return over (-1, +1)/(-2, +2) relative to 
repurchase announcements, adjusted to the value-weighted market index return over the 
same window. 
Share pledge is the percentage of the controlling shareholder’s ownership that is pledged to 
banks at the month-end prior to repurchase announcement.  
Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (in NT$ million) at the month-end 
prior to repurchase announcement.  
B/M is the book-to-market ratio available at the month-end prior to the repurchase 
announcement. 
Size (B/M) decile rank is the decile ranking of size (B/M) relative to stock universe. 
Prior return is the three-month buy-and-hold raw return ending on three days prior to repurchase 
announcement. 
Low prior return dummy is equal to one if the prior return is lower than -20%, zero otherwise.  
Increase pledge dummy is equal to one if the change in share pledges is positive during three 
months prior to repurchase announcement, zero otherwise.  
LEV is the industry-adjusted leverage, defined as the difference between the net leverage in the 
year prior to the repurchase announcement and the target net leverage ratio where the net 
leverage is the ratio of net debt (debt minus cash and equivalents) to total assets and the 
target net leverage ratio is the median net debt-to-asset of all firms in the same industry. 
FCF is free cash flow measured by Lehn and Poulson (1988) divided by sales in the year prior to 
repurchase announcement and is adjusted for industry median within the same two-digit 
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SIC code.  
Control rights is the sum of the direct and indirect voting rights held by the controlling 
shareholders of a company at the month-end prior to the repurchase announcement. Direct 
voting rights consist of the rights to those shares registered in the name of the controlling 
shareholder and his/her family members who make up the same group of people related 
through blood or marriage. Indirect voting rights are the rights to those shares held by 
entities, which are controlled by the controlling shareholder. 
Cash flow rights is the sum of the direct and indirect cash flow rights held by the controlling 
shareholders of a company at the month-end prior to the repurchase announcement. Direct 
cash flow rights is equal to the direct voting rights minus the shareholding held by the 
foundation. Indirect cash flow rights are the product of the shareholdings for each chain of 
ownership that is characterized by a pyramid structure and cross-shareholdings among the 
different groups within a company. 
Change in cash flow rights is defined as the change of cash flow rights for one-year prior to 
repurchase announcement and is adjusted for stock bonus. To adjust the impact of stock 
bonus, we ignore the increase of cash flow rights in the month of paying stock bonus. 
KZ index is developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) which is used to measure a firm’s financial 
constraint. 
Institutional ownership is the percentage of shareholdings for institutional investor at the 
month-end prior to repurchase announcement. 
Blockhodler ownership is the percentage of shareholdings for the largest outsider at the 
month-end prior to repurchase announcement. 
Board independence is equal to one if the proportion of independent director to board size is 
more than 50%, zero otherwise; the definition of independent director is the board members 
who do not belong to the control shareholder and the insider. 
 
B. Long-run return methodology 
To examine the relation between share pledges and long-run abnormal returns, we follow a 
two-step procedure by Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998). The first step is to extract 
the factor component, allowing varying factor loadings across firms, and estimate the 
risk-adjusted return each month. Using all monthly returns during the sample period, we run the 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model for each sample firm.  
0 1 2 3( ) + SMB + HML +it ft i mt ft i t i t itR R R R             (A1) 
where (Rit – Rft) is the excess return for stock i, (Rmt – Rft) is the market excess return, SMBt is 
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the size factor, and HMLt is the book-to-market factor, all in month t. The risk-adjusted return is 
the sum of regression intercept (0) and error term (). Then we run Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
cross-sectional regressions in the second step. For each month from November 2000 to 
December 2009, the monthly regression is carried out by regressing risk-adjusted returns against 
share pledges and control variables. To avoid the impact of outliers, risk-adjusted returns are 
winsorized at top and bottom 0.5%. Sample firms that have announced repurchases in any of the 






This table reports descriptive statistics of the repurchase sample from October 13, 2000 to December 31, 2006. 
Panel A reports characteristics of repurchase program, and Panel B reports key variables in this study. The variable 
definitions are detailed in the appendix. All variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1% to mitigate the impact of 
outliers. N is the numbers of observations. 
 
 Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Panel A. Characteristics of share repurchase (N = 1,386) 
Actual buyback amount (NT$ MM) 133.9 305.9 0.0 16.9 41.6 108.2 2,247.3 
Intended ratio (%) 3.18 1.99 0.38 1.75 2.74 4.21 10.00 
Actual buyback (%) 2.05 1.60 0.00 0.83 1.71 2.90 7.59 
Completion ratio (%) 69.2 34.6 0.0 38.5 84.4 100.0 100.0 
Three-day CAR (%) 1.44 5.48 -14.61 -1.68 1.59 4.45 15.87 
Five-day CAR (%) 1.51 7.06 -18.21 -2.46 1.51 5.67 21.02 
 
Panel B. Key variables (N = 1,386) 
Share pledge (%) 11.7 17.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.8 72.5 
Size 7.99 1.35 5.68 6.98 7.80 8.71 12.05 
B/M 1.13 0.63 0.18 0.64 1.03 1.50 3.06 
Size decile rank 5.95 2.68 1.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 
B/M decile rank 6.12 2.56 1.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 
Prior return (%) -12.63 21.87 -59.62 -26.71 -13.04 0.37 56.73 
LEV (%) -7.43 22.38 -72.43 -20.70 -3.60 7.26 35.73 
FCF (%) 1.88 12.36 -43.42 -3.55 0.11 5.60 52.81 
Cash flow rights 21.22 14.04 1.07 10.82 17.55 29.86 61.00 
Change in cash flow rights -0.43 4.02 -15.10 -1.63 -0.10 0.79 13.98 
Institution ownership (%) 7.43 10.05 0.00 0.51 3.68 9.59 49.89 
Blockhodler onwership (%) 2.67 3.00 0.00 0.01 1.94 3.91 15.86 




Firm Characteristics of Repurchase and Non-Repurchase Quarters 
 
This table reports firm characteristics for repurchase and non-repurchase firms during October 2000 to December 
2006. A repurchase quarter (the first column) is the firm-quarter observation that the firm made a repurchase 
announcement in the given quarter. All remaining firm-quarter observations that are not classified as repurchase 
quarters are called non-repurchase quarters (the second column). Share pledge is the percentage of the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership that is pledged to banks. Size is the natural log of market value of equity. B/M is the 
book-to-market ratio defined as the book value of common equity divided by the market value of equity. Prior 
return is the prior three month buy-and-hold raw return. LEV is the industry-adjusted leverage, defined as the 
difference between the net leverage and the target net leverage, where the net leverage is the ratio of net debt (debt 
minus cash and equivalents) to total assets and the target net leverage ratio is the median net debt-to-asset of all 
firms in the same two-digit SIC code. FCF is free cash flow measured by Lehn and Poulson (1988) scaled by sales 
and is adjusted by industry median with the same two-digit SIC code. Cash dividend is the cash divided by the 
market value of equity. Institutional ownership is the percentage of shareholdings for institutional investor. 
Blockholder ownership is the percentage of shareholdings for the largest outsider. Independent director is the 
proportion of independent director to board size, while the definition of independent director is the board members 
who do not belong to the control shareholder and the insider. All variables are measured prior to the given quarter 
and are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. For each column, the first row reports mean value and the second row 
reports median value (with parentheses). The last column reports the difference in firm characteristics between 
repurchase and non-repurchase firms. For the third column, *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively, of t-statistics for means and z-statistics for medians. N is the numbers of firm-quarter observations. 
 
 Repurchase (1)  Non-repurchase (2) 
 N = 1,345 N = 21,714 
Difference (1) – (2)
(T-stat) 
Share pledge (%) 11.54  10.14 1.39** 
 [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] 
Size 8.03  7.77 0.26*** 
 [7.85]  [7.64] [0.21]*** 
B/M 1.09  1.10 -0.01 
 [0.97]  [0.85] [0.12]*** 
Prior return (%) -7.60  3.19 -10.79*** 
 [-8.76]  [-0.27] [-8.49]*** 
LEV (%) -7.38  -1.66 -5.72*** 
 [-3.62]  [0.00] [-3.62]*** 
FCF (%) 1.49  -3.13 4.62*** 
 [0.25]  [0.00] [0.25]*** 
Cash dividend (%) 1.96  2.13 -0.17* 
 [1.08]  [0.81] [0.27] 
Institutional ownership (%) 7.63  8.44 -0.81** 
 [3.90]  [3.46] [0.44] 
Blockhodler ownership (%) 2.75  3.17 -0.42*** 
 [2.03]  [1.96] [0.07] 
Independent director (%) 40.02  39.68 0.33 
 [41.67]  [42.86] [-1.19] 
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Table 3 
Logit Regression of Share Repurchase 
 
This table reports logit regressions of repurchases. The dependent variable is equal to one if it is a repurchase quarter 
and zero otherwise, where a repurchase quarter is the firm-quarter observation that the firm made a repurchase 












dividendCash LEVFCF                                   
B/MSizedummy pledge Increase*pledge Share                                   
dummyreturn prior  Low*pledge Sharepledge Share1RepurchasePr
 
Share pledge, size, B/M, prior return, LEV, FCF and cash dividend are defined in Table 2. Low prior return dummy 
is equal to one if the prior three-month return is lower than -20%, zero otherwise. Increase pledge dummy is equal to 
one if the change in share pledges is positive during three months prior to the given quarter, zero otherwise. All 
variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. Numbers in brackets are p-values. *, **, and *** denote significance 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. N is the numbers of observations in regressions. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -3.714 -3.683 -3.700 -3.721 -3.707 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Share pledge 0.515 0.451 0.354 0.291 0.158 
 [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.037]** [0.124] [0.433] 
Share pledge*Prior return  -0.018    
  [0.000]***    
Share pledge*Low prior return dummy   0.592  0.551 
   [0.025]**  [0.037]** 
Share pledge*Increase pledge dummy    0.506 0.465 
    [0.038]** [0.056]* 
Size 0.112 0.113 0.112 0.112 0.113 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
B/M 0.080 0.047 0.065 0.084 0.070 
 [0.033]** [0.211] [0.085]* [0.024]** [0.063]* 
FCF 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
LEV -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Cash dividend -0.073 -0.075 -0.073 -0.073 -0.073 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Pseudo R-squared (%) 2.403 2.649 2.461 2.454 2.504 




Estimated Probability of Share Repurchase 
 
This table reports the estimated probability levels of share repurchase on specific hypothesized values of the explanatory variables which are related to different 
motivations of share repurchase in Table 3. Panel A uses fitted coefficient values in Model 1 of Table 3 to describe the estimated probability of repurchase. Row 1 
considers the base case, assuming all explanatory variables are set at their sample means. Row 2 reports the probability of a repurchase for a firm that face pledge 
motivation, with a share pledge ratio at sample mean plus one standard deviation and holding other explanatory variables with mean values. Rows 3–6 describe 
the impact of traditional motivations, while holding the others constant at neutral levels. Row 3 is for undervaluation motivation, with a B/M ratio at sample 
mean plus one standard deviation. Row 4 is for free cash flow motivation, with a FCF at sample mean plus one standard deviation. Row 5 is for leverage 
motivation, with a LEV at sample mean minus one standard deviation. Row 6 is for dividend substitute, with a cash dividend at sample mean minus one standard 
deviation. Panel B uses the fitted coefficient values in Model 5 of Table 3 to describe the estimated probability of share repurchase, indicating that repurchasing 
firms may face larger market pressure on share price (a lower prior returns and an increase of share pledge ratio) when describe control-agency motivation. All 
estimated methods are as same as Panel A, except for we set low prior return dummy and the increase pledge dummy to equal one in Row 2, and to be zero in 
remaining rows. 
 
Panel A. Based on the fitted coefficient values reported in Model 1 of Table 3:  
  it it it it it itPr Repurchase 1 -3.714 0.515*Share pledge 0.112*Size 0.08* B/M 0.008*FCF - 0.013*LEV - 0.073*Cash dividend it        
Repurchase motivation 
Share 







a function of 
repurchase 
motivation




Base case 0.10 7.79 1.10 -2.86 -2.00 2.12 -2.85 0.06 5.45% 100.00% 
Pledge motivation 0.30 7.79 1.10 -2.86 -2.00 2.12 -2.75 0.06 5.99% 109.82% 
Undervaluation motivation 0.10 7.79 2.03 -2.86 -2.00 2.12 -2.78 0.06 5.85% 107.23% 
Free cash flow motivation 0.10 7.79 1.10 21.48 -2.00 2.12 -2.66 0.07 6.55% 120.09% 
Leverage motivation  0.10 7.79 1.10 -2.86 -24.97 2.12 -2.55 0.08 7.21% 132.28% 




Estimated Probability of Share Repurchase 
 
Panel B. Based on the fitted coefficient values reported in Model 5 of Table 3:  
  it it it it it
it it
Pr Repurchase 1 -3.707 0.158*Share pledge 0.551*Share pledge *Low prior return dummy 0.465*Share pledge *Increase pledge dummy
                                   0.113*Size 0.07*B/M 0.008*F
    

































Base case 0.10 0.00 0.00 7.79 1.10 -2.86 -2.00 2.12 -2.89 0.06 5.29% 100.00% 
Pledge motivation 0.30 0.30 0.30 7.79 1.37 -2.86 -2.00 2.12 -2.54 0.08 7.34% 138.78% 
Undervaluation motivation 0.10 0.00 0.00 7.79 2.03 -2.86 -2.00 2.12 -2.82 0.06 5.62% 106.31% 
Free cash flow motivation 0.10 0.00 0.00 7.79 1.10 21.48 -2.00 2.12 -2.69 0.07 6.35% 120.13% 
Leverage motivation  0.10 0.00 0.00 7.79 1.10 -2.86 -24.97 2.12 -2.59 0.08 7.00% 132.36% 





Tobit Regression of Actual Repurchases 
 
This table provides the Tobit regressions of actual repurchase activity. The dependent variable is equal to actual 
buyback if it is a repurchase quarter and zero otherwise, where a repurchase quarter is the firm-quarter observation 
that the firm made a repurchase announcement in a given quarter. Actual buyback is defined as the percentage of 
shares actually purchased during the two-month repurchase period to shares outstanding prior to repurchase 
announcement. Share pledge, size, B/M, prior return, LEV, FCF and cash dividend are defined in Table 2. Low prior 
return dummy is equal to one if the prior three-month return is lower than -20%, zero otherwise. Increase pledge 
dummy is equal to one if the change in share pledges is positive during three months prior to the given quarter, zero 
otherwise. All variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. Numbers in brackets are p-values. *, **, and *** 
denote significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. N is the numbers of observations in regressions. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -8.902 -8.830 -8.869 -8.919 -8.887 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Share pledge 1.365 1.249 0.990 0.817 0.524 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.010]** [0.057]* [0.249] 
Share pledge*Prior return  -0.041    
  [0.000]***    
Share pledge*Low prior return dummy   1.399  1.278 
   [0.023]**  [0.040]** 
Share pledge*Increase pledge dummy    1.251 1.139 
    [0.026]** [0.044]** 
Size 0.172 0.174 0.172 0.173 0.173 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
B/M 0.120 0.054 0.089 0.132 0.102 
 [0.166] [0.542] [0.312] [0.129] [0.244] 
FCF 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
LEV -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Cash dividend -0.154 -0.158 -0.154 -0.153 -0.153 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Pseudo R-squared (%) 1.229 1.356 1.250 1.249 1.264 
N 23,058 23,058 23058 23,058 23058 
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Table 6 
Regressions of Announcement Returns 
 
This table reports cross-sectional regressions of short-run returns around repurchase announcements. The dependent 
variable is a three-day (-1, +1) cumulative return around repurchase announcement, adjusted for the value-weighted 
market index return over the same period. The variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. All variables are 
winsorized at top and bottom 1%. Year dummies are included but not reported. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics with White’s (1980) standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
N is the number of observations in the regression. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept 2.037 0.235 -0.001 0.073 0.429 0.268 0.457 
 (4.85)*** (0.18) (0.00) (0.06) (0.34) (0.21) (0.37) 
Share pledge -0.028 -0.023 -0.003 -0.010 -0.005 0.003 -0.001 
 (-3.05)*** (-2.28)** (-0.23) (-0.90) (-0.39) (0.21) (-0.09) 
Share pledge*Prior return   0.149     
   (3.11)***     
Share pledge    -0.034  -0.028 -0.026 
*Low prior return dummy    (-1.89)*  (-1.52) (-1.41) 
Share pledge     -0.032 -0.027 -0.028 
*Increase pledge dummy     (-2.14)** (-1.80)* (-1.83)* 
Size  -0.021 -0.021 -0.016 -0.040 -0.034 -0.053 
  (-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.33) (-0.28) (-0.47) 
B/M  0.960 0.977 0.972 0.927 0.942 1.059 
  (3.32)*** (3.42)*** (3.37)*** (3.23)*** (3.28)*** (3.61)***
FCF  -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015  
  (-1.08) (-1.16) (-1.09) (-1.05) (-1.06)  
LEV  -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016  
  (-2.23)** (-2.38)** (-2.29)** (-2.20)** (-2.26)**  
Intended ratio  0.262 0.260 0.264 0.254 0.257 0.262 
  (3.36)*** (3.43)*** (3.43)*** (3.27)*** (3.33)*** (3.39)***
Prior return  -0.019 -0.038 -0.025 -0.020 -0.025 -0.023 
  (-2.22)** (-3.91)*** (-2.81)*** (-2.43)** (-2.84)*** (-2.61)***
Change in cash flow rights  -0.012 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 
  (-0.32) (-0.42) (-0.39) (-0.41) (-0.46) (-0.35) 
KZ index       -0.121 
       (-1.01) 
Adj. R-squared (%) 1.929 4.404 5.530 4.645 4.700 4.826 4.570 
N 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,386 
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Table 7 
Long-Run Abnormal Returns 
 
This table reports monthly cross-sectional regressions of long-run abnormal returns. The dependent variable is the 
monthly risk-adjusted return in %. The estimation of risk-adjusted returns is shown in the appendix. The variable 
definitions are detailed in the appendix and are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. The numbers reported in this table 
are the time-series averages of coefficients based on monthly cross-sectional regressions. Numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics based on time-series coefficients. To mitigate the outlier effect, we drop months where the number of 
firms is below 20. There are 108 months used in the test. The number in parentheses is t-statistics with Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept -1.446 -1.126 -1.183 -1.096 -1.138 -1.126 
 (-10.27)** (-2.33)** (-2.29)** (-2.11)** (-2.21)** (-1.94)* 
Share pledge -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.004 -0.013 -0.003 
 (-3.17)*** (-2.32)** (-1.39) (-0.52) (-2.10)** (-0.69) 
Share pledge*Prior return   -0.028    
   (-0.64)    
Share pledge*Low prior return dummy    -0.006  -0.012 
    (-0.47)  (-1.05) 
Share pledge*Increase pledge dummy     -0.0002 0.004 
     (-0.02) (0.31) 
Size  -0.079 -0.074 -0.081 -0.078 -0.078 
  (-1.26) (-1.08) (-1.28) (-1.23) (-1.18) 
B/M  0.221 0.255 0.229 0.208 0.232 
  (1.44) (1.69)* (1.35) (1.22) (1.22) 
FCF  -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.022 -0.022 
  (-1.39) (-1.42) (-1.41) (-1.55) (-1.61) 
LEV  -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 
  (-3.11)*** (-3.12)*** (-3.12)*** (-3.12)*** (-3.10)***
Actual buyback  -0.017 -0.031 -0.026 -0.013 -0.024 
  (-0.68) (-1.10) (-0.82) (-0.51) (-0.77) 
Change in cash flow rights  -0.005 -0.006 -0.012 -0.006 -0.016 





Regressions of Announcement Returns: Exclude Optimistic Samples 
 
This table reexamines cross-sectional regressions of short-run returns around repurchase announcements. We use 
Lin, Hu, and Chen’s (2005) overconfidence measure to exclude overconfidence samples from our sample. The 
dependent variable is a three-day (-1, +1) cumulative return around repurchase announcement, adjusted for the 
value-weighted market index return over the same period. The variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. All 
variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. Year dummies are included but not reported. Numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics with White’s (1980) standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. N is the number of observations in the regression. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 2.280 0.428 0.178 0.207 0.644 0.396 
 (4.81)*** (0.30) (0.13) (0.15) (0.45) (0.28) 
Share pledge -0.035 -0.028 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 0.002 
 (-3.30)*** (-2.38)** (-0.70) (-0.71) (-0.70) (0.12) 
Share pledge*Prior return   0.144    
   (2.76)***    
Share pledge*Low prior return dummy    -0.051  -0.045 
    (-2.39)**  (-2.07)**
Share pledge*Increase pledge dummy     -0.033 -0.024 
     (-1.84)* (-1.37) 
Size  -0.016 -0.014 -0.010 -0.037 -0.027 
  (-0.12) (-0.10) (-0.07) (-0.27) (-0.20) 
B/M  1.056 1.072 1.069 1.010 1.033 
  (3.04)*** (3.13)*** (3.09)*** (2.93)*** (3.01)***
FCF  -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 
  (-0.89) (-0.98) (-0.97) (-0.87) (-0.95) 
LEV  -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 
  (-2.45)** (-2.59)*** (-2.56)** (-2.44)** (-2.54)**
Intended ratio  0.225 0.227 0.232 0.222 0.230 
  (2.63)*** (2.72)*** (2.76)*** (2.61)*** (2.73)***
Prior return  -0.025 -0.042 -0.034 -0.027 -0.034 
  (-2.62)*** (-3.99)*** (-3.36)*** (-2.79)*** (-3.39)***
Change in cash flow rights  -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 
  (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.17) (-0.14) (-0.19) 
Adj. R-squared (%) 2.205 4.821 5.916 5.353 5.077 5.452 




Regressions of Announcement Returns: Different Controlling Power Groups 
 
This table reports cross-sectional regressions of short-run returns around repurchase announcements for different 
controlling power groups. We divide the whole sample into two groups according to the median of controlling 
shareholders’ control rights. “Below median” represents the companies with lower control concern; while “Above 
median” represents the companies with larger control rights. The dependent variable is a three-day (-1, +1) 
cumulative return around repurchase announcement, adjusted for the value-weighted market index return over the 
same period. The variable definitions are detailed in the appendix. All variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. 
Year dummies are included but not reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics with White’s (1980) standard 
errors. *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. N is the number of observations in the 
regression. 
 
 Below median Above median 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Intercept -1.609 -1.585 0.487 0.481 
 (-0.94) (-0.93) (0.25) (0.25) 
Share pledge 0.0009 0.011 -0.044 0.004 
 (0.07) (0.68) (-3.13)*** (0.15) 
Share pledge*Low prior return dummy  -0.006  -0.052 
  (-0.25)  (-2.09)** 
Share pledge*Increase pledge dummy  -0.015  -0.044 
  (-0.70)  (-1.89)* 
Size 0.094 0.090 0.018 0.004 
 (0.57) (0.55) (0.09) (0.02) 
B/M 0.893 0.881 1.211 1.223 
 (2.42)** (2.40)** (2.67)*** (2.75)***
FCF -0.023 -0.023 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-1.25) (-1.23) (-0.58) (-0.57) 
LEV -0.035 -0.035 0.004 0.004 
 (-3.73)*** (-3.71)*** (0.40) (0.39) 
Intended ratio 0.352 0.351 0.237 0.222 
 (3.16)*** (3.15)*** (2.13)** (2.05)** 
Prior three-month return -0.017 -0.020 -0.028 -0.038 
 (-1.64) (-1.72)* (-2.20)** (-2.91)***
Change in cash flow rights -0.071 -0.074 -0.008 -0.018 
 (-1.18) (-1.22) (-0.18) (-0.38) 
Adj. R-squared (%) 5.060 4.898 4.766 5.965 
N 693 693 693 693 
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Table 10 
Share Repurchase and Corporate Governance 
 
This table examines how corporate governance affects share repurchase. Models 1 and 2 report logit and tobit 
regression of repurchase, respectively. Model 3 reports cross-sectional regressions of short-run returns around 
repurchase announcements. All procedures are as same as Table 3, Table 5, and Table 6. For models 1 and 2, 
numbers in brackets are p-values. For model 3, Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics with White’s (1980) standard 
errors. *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. N is the number of observations in the 
regression. 
 
Logistic Model Tobit Model  Three-day CAR 
Model 1 2  3 
Intercept -3.729 -8.939 0.026 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** (0.02) 
Share pledge 0.838 2.014 -0.027 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** (-1.97)** 
Share pledge*Institutional ownership -0.010 -0.021 -0.072 
 [0.434] [0.471] (-0.99) 
Share pledge*Blockholder ownership -0.122 -0.256 0.391 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** (1.37) 
Share pledge*Board independence  0.203 0.611 0.012 
 [0.506] [0.379] (0.60) 
Size 0.114 0.178 0.002 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** (0.02) 
B/M 0.074 0.110 0.978 
 [0.049]** [0.206] (3.39)*** 
FCF 0.008 0.019 -0.014 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** (-1.05) 
LEV -0.013 -0.031 -0.016 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** (-2.29)** 
Cash dividend -0.072 -0.152  
 [0.000]*** [0.000]***  
Intended ratio   0.256 
   (3.29)*** 
Prior return   -0.019 
   (-2.23)** 
Change in cash flow rights   -0.014 
   (-0.38) 
Pseudo R-squared/ Adj-R-squared (%) 2.546 1.266 4.424 
N 23,058 23,058 1,386 
 
